Playing Hollinger's Game

One of the great things about John Hollinger's analyses is that they're not predicated on opinion. There are quantifiable variables in his conclusions. Tangible premises. Corporeal facts. They're about observing what has already happened to determine what might happen in the future. It's statistics, not opinion which is good because everyone knows what opinions have in common with assholes; they often stink. I will now proceed to use Hollinger's own statistical analysis against him.

In his latest ESPN article, Hollinger explains that he believed that the wiser choice for the Suns in game 1 would have been for them to foul Ginobili at the end of the game rather than allowing him to kick it out to Duncan for the game-tying 3. I dispute this claim using the same premises as Hollinger's "Hack-a-Ben" theory and his "expected points return" concept from earlier in the article.

Now disregarding the possibility that Ginobili would have shot the ball while being fouled, which he is more than capable of, and would have been awarded an and-1, the expected points return from fouling Ginobili would have worked out like this:

He's approx. an 89% free-throw shooter so the expected return on his first shot is:
0.889 x 1 = 0.889

Since there was practically no time left on the clock I'm assuming that he would have intentionally missed the second free throw.

The Spurs had 12 of the total 44 rebounds that came off the Suns hoop which equates to them rebounding approx 27.3% of their missed shots. Since they were also shooting 50.5% from the field for the game, the expected point return is:
0.273 x 0.505 x 2 = 0.276

Therefore, the expected point return total is:
0.889 + 0.276 = 1.165

Since Duncan had not shot a 3-pointer the entire season I am using his career numbers for 3-pt shooting, which is 19%. Therefore, the expected point return total on Tim Duncan shooting a 3-pt shot is:
0.19 x 3 = 0.57

So, as you can see, the expected point return total for letting Duncan shoot the three was just a little over half the expected point total for fouling Ginobili and that is without taking into account the possibility that Ginobili would have attempted and made a shot on being fouled. This confirms that in this particular instance, intuition, tradition and the mathematician can all happily concur that the Suns did the right thing. The fates had other ideas though.

This all goes to show that in sports, as in life, the best you can ever do is play the percentages. It's the safest bet, but it isn't perfect, not by a long-shot. It's also usually less fun than doing the crazy thing.

On a lighter note, can you imagine playing pick-up ball with Hollinger and his calculator? That's probably a completely unique experience.